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Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to
Connectedness
Allan R. Steint

The theme of this Symposium is "Frontiers of Jurisdiction."
The metaphor of the "frontier" is particularly apt in this context.
It evokes a place at the outer margins of state authority: the Old
West, outer space, the sea-a place where the authority of a state
is ambiguous; where private ordering may do more work than
public; where the demarcation lines of official authority are
blurred; and where numerous states may assert regulatory
claims. It is a place where some laws-murder and robbery-get
enforced, but others-gambling and prostitution-are honored in
the breach. Those "frontier" qualities have a remarkable correspondence to the problems discussed in this Symposium, right
down to the gambling and sex. The only things missing are the
whiskey and horses.
To the extent that the word "frontier" describes a physical
space on the outskirts of physical borders, the description is, for
the most part, only a metaphor here. In each of these problemsthe continued viability of general jurisdiction, cross-border cyberspace searches, universal jurisdiction, and legislative jurisdiction
over the internet-we know, more or less, where the defendants
acted, where the victim was injured, and where the defendant is
located at the time of the litigation. The marginality derives not
from ambiguities in physical space, but from conceptual ambivalence in our understanding of state authority.
This ambivalence is, in significant measure, a function of a
technological change. Jurisdictional principles derived from a
world where physical borders were more or less effective in allocating the sovereign prerogatives of states are strained by technologies, such as the internet, that connect people across borders.
t Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. I would like to thank
Ari Affilalo, Roger Clark, Perry Dane, Linda Silberman, Beth Stephens and Domingo
Villaronga for their helpful comments and suggestions. Virginia Langfitt provided valuable research assistance. Please note that this Article was written before the tragic events
of September 11, 2001. It may well be that those events have further transformed our
thinking about the effects of globalization on our jurisdictional conceptions.

373

374

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2001:

As we turn to newer jurisdictional theories that can accommodate
this interconnectedness, we delegitimate older jurisdictional assumptions premised on isolation. The four seemingly discrete
subjects considered in this Symposium are, in fact, all variations
on the same theme. Each problem represents the confrontation of
the previously isolated, autonomous sovereign with a newly interconnected world and the resulting growing pains accompanying that encounter: the old jurisdictional clothes do not fit the
new body politic, but we are not ready to donate them to Goodwill
quite yet.
The jurisdictional problems under discussion implicate two
kinds of state authority: authority to prescribe rules of conduct
(legislative or "prescriptive" jurisdiction), and authority to provide a remedy (judicial and investigatory jurisdiction). While the
justifications for each kind of authority vary, they have much in
common. Each problem forces us to ask, in slightly different
ways, the same question: what justifies the operation of the coercive power of a state against an individual? In particular, the
problems expose a tension between two competing visions of state
authority, one based on mere presence and another based on
mere regulatory interests.
I. JURISDICTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS

A.

Presence-Based Justifications

A presence-based theory of state authority derives from the
presumptive authority that states possess over persons and property within their borders. It has its origins in a "power" theory of
jurisdiction typified by Pennoyer v Neff,1 and is associated principally with judicial jurisdiction. It accepts the realpolitik of
autonomous, non-cooperating nation-states: the king has "authority" over any person or property subject to the control of his
army.2 In the United States, Pennoyer converted this truism into
a constitutional norm, holding that state authority is justified
only to the extent that it represents the exercise of that power
over persons or property within the state's borders.'

95 US 714 (1877).

See Kevin M. Clermont, JurisdictionalSalvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 Cornell
L Rev 89, 100-03 (1999) (criticizing the persistence of power as basis for U.S. jurisdictional doctrine).
3 95 US at 722.
2
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Presence also serves to protect a defendant's autonomy. Because, under this approach, a defendant is subject to state authority when she is within the state territory, she can control her
amenability to jurisdiction by staying away.
In this sense, more modern contractarian accounts of jurisdiction, such as "purposeful availment,"4 are related to presence
by seeking to honor a defendant's autonomy.5 Like presencebased explanations, contractarian theories of jurisdiction are
premised on a view of individuals as inherently free from obligations to each other and to any particular sovereign authority.
Through this lens, a defendant's relationship with a sovereign
may be viewed as governed by the same principles that mediate
individuals' relationships to each other.6 Indeed, Professor Epstein has done an able job demonstrating how private law can
serve as a jurisdictional model.7
Notice the parallel between the contractarian model of jurisdiction and the hermetically-sealed Pennoyer sovereign: both
state and individual are viewed as autonomous and disconnected.
Individuals, like states, incur obligations only if assumed of their
own volition. Both are otherwise autonomous, free actors.8
However deep our ideological commitments to those autonomy premises may be, technology poses a series of challenges.
Through technology, individuals are able to cause harm in states
where they have no physical or volitional connection. The internet is only the most recent manifestation of this phenomenon.
Almost fifty years before the internet, the Supreme Court be4 See Hanson v Denkla, 357 US 235, 253 (1958) ("It is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities with the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws."). See also note 79.
5 See Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 479-80 (1985):
This "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a defendant will
not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts . . or of the "unilateral activity of another
party or third person" .

.

.

Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the

contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that
create a "substantial connection" with the forum State.
6 For a general discussion, see Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of PersonalJurisdiction,65 Tex L Rev 689 (1987).
7 See Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction,2001 U
Chi Legal F 1, 2 (discussing how "the consent principle neatly explains the dynamics of
many of our jurisdictional doctrines").
8 See Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understandingof Legal Consciousness:
The Case of ClassicalLegal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 Research in Law & Sociology 2, 11 (1980) (describing legal consciousness in the Pennoyer period as dominated by
view of legal actors and institutions as autonomous).
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lieved that "modern transportation and communication" had
transformed jurisdictional law to take account of the "national
economy":
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope
of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other
nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years.
Today many commercial transactions touch two or more
States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce
has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a
State where he engages in economic activity.9
Thus, in order to protect persons and property within its borders,
a state must have the authority to regulate beyond its borders.
Moreover, as we have learned from the Symposium Panel
discussing whether the United States should be able to investigate offshore criminal acts committed via the internet, technology
also has transformed the nature of state power. Physical territory
is no longer a good measure of the reach of a state's coercive ability. States, like individuals, can now exert influence well beyond
their borders. This was probably always true of the more powerful states, but technology is the great leveler; the same technology that allows U.S. officials to probe offshore computer records
exposes American citizens to surveillance by foreign governments. However much we want to adopt an isolationist stance,
such a position is increasingly at odds with reality. Whether we
like it or not, the world is wired. This will introduce a new humility into our jurisdictional assumptions.
B. Regulatory Justifications
The competing, "regulatory" justification for state authority
is implicit in most conflict-of-laws approaches, from lex loci delictus o to modern interest analysis. The Supreme Court extended
9 McGee v InternationalLife Insurance Co, 355 US 220, 222-23 (1957).
10 "The law of the place where the tort was committed." Black's Law Dictionary 923

(West 7th ed 1999).
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the justification to support adjudicatory jurisdiction as well in
International Shoe Co v Washington." A regulatory, or "effects"
justification, posits that a state has authority to act coercively
when it seeks to protect persons or property within its borders. 2
In contrast to presence-based authority, regulatory justifications
depend on respect and cooperation among sovereigns. A state adjudicating a controversy arising from out-of-state injury may
choose to apply another state's law in deference to that state's
superior regulatory claim. Conversely, a court asserting jurisdiction over an absent defendant relies on the extraterritorial enforcement of its judgment by other states that acknowledge its
regulatory claims over the controversy.
Regulatory justifications, in contrast to justifications based
on presence, raise serious concerns about the autonomy of defendants. While a defendant may be able to control his location, he
may not be able to control where his actions have effects." Simi11326 US 310, 318 (1945) (holding that even single acts by a corporate agent, "because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be
deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit"). See also Hess v Pawolski, 274
US 352, 356 (1927) (justifying implied consent to jurisdiction over an out-of-state driver on
the ground that "the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to
promote care on the part of all, residents, and non-residents alike").
12 See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 402(c) (1987) (a state
has "jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to... conduct outside of its territory that has or
is intended to have substantial effect within its territory"); Gray v American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp, 176 NE2d 761, 766-67 (Ill 1961) (asserting jurisdiction over
manufacturer on the basis of an in-state explosion allegedly caused by defective manufacturing outside the state).
There is some tension in conflict-of-laws approaches between whether this regulatory interest ought to be tied to the place of activity or domicile. The older lex loci rule of
the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws was more territorial than the later approach of
the Second Restatement. Under the First Restatement, a party's rights were vested according to the place where the last liability-creating action occurred. See Restatement of
Conflict of Laws §§ 377-79 (1934) (dictating that the laws of the state "where the last
event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place" govern liability and
injury issues). Under the Second Restatement, as well as other modern conflict-of-laws
approaches, the law of a party's domicile may trump the law of the place of the wrongful
activity. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971) (prescribing that the
rights and liabilities in tort are governed by the law of the state that "has the most significant relationship to the occurrences and the parties"). See also id at § 145 comment d
("IL]ocal law of the state where the parties are domiciled, rather than the local law of the
state of conduct and injury may be applied to determine whether one party is immune
from tort liability."). However, insofar as domicile is defined by reference to a territorial
state, both approaches are ultimately bottomed on giving effect to a state's territorial
regulatory interests; the authority a state has over its domiciles is an authority over persons habitually present within its territory. See Perry Dane, Conflict of Laws, in Dennis
Patterson, A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 209, 211-14 (Blackwell
1996).
13 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 296 (1980) ("If foreseeability were the criterion ...[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel
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larly, such justifications also generate more inter-sovereign colli-

sions. Presence-based jurisdictional models and their progeny
have the virtue of limiting the number of sovereigns with regulatory claims over any particular behavior-namely, only those
states with which defendants have chosen to affiliate. The Achilles' heel of effects justifications is the absence of a limiting principle. Effects-based authority raises the specter of interjurisdictional gridlock in a world where actions have global effects.
In situations where both presence-based as well as regulatory forms of justification are available, a state's assertion of authority is non-controversial, at least in the modern era. When a
defendant acts in a territory and causes effects there, a state's
authority to exercise jurisdiction is clear, even if the defendant is
not present at the time of the litigation.
Assertions of authority based on only one form of justification, however, generate interjurisdictional confusion. The four
topics of the Symposium represent, in my view, the consequences
of basing state authority on a single form of justification. The
general jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction problems in the
Symposium represent situations in which the defendant has had
some significant presence in the state (at the time of either the
litigation or the cause of action), but the state lacks a significant
regulatory stake because the defendant's actions do not implicate
the well-being of its inhabitants. The internet problems, in turn,
are situations in which the state has some significant regulatory
interest because the defendant's actions affected the well-being of
its residents, but the state lacks conventional authority to control
persons acting within its territory.
We have come to think of these problems as discrete: one
deals with judicial authority, the others legislative or executive;
some deal with criminal authority, others with civil; some deal
with international controversies, others with domestic; one deals
with constitutional limits, another with international norms.
While these distinctions can be significant, we tend to overplay
the differences. In fact, if these problems are examined as a
whole, some universal principles of authority start to emerge.
Therefore, in the next section these differences are collapsed to
try to conceptualize the nature of sovereign authority. Subsequently, I will try to tease out the different contexts and see what
difference, if any, they make.
his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel.").
See also text accompanying notes 70-76.
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II. THE SYMPOSIUM PANELS
A.

Presence-Based Authority

The problems discussed in both the General Jurisdiction and
Universal Jurisdiction Panels share the same difficulty: the adjudicating state lacks a significant connection with the underlying
controversy. The key difference between the two is that the authority claimed for general jurisdiction is all-purpose and violates
international norms of jurisdiction, 4 while the authority asserted
for universal jurisdiction is for the limited purpose of policing violations of internationally-accepted norms."5 Both, however, share
problems inherent in asserting presence-based authority.
1. General jurisdiction.
It is important to distinguish among the various forms of
general jurisdiction. No one, including the international community, doubts a state's authority to assert jurisdiction over any controversy brought against one of its citizens, regardless of the connection of the controversy to the forum. That form of general (or
all-purpose) jurisdiction is not problematic. Similarly, few question the ability of parties to submit volitionally to the judicial authority of any state, regardless of that state's connection to the
controversy.
The controversial cases of general jurisdiction are ones where
non-consensual state authority is based on a non-citizen's past or
current presence in the state. Transient service on an individual
under Burnham v Superior Court of California" and systematic
corporate contacts under Perkins v Benguet Consolidated Mining
Co'7 are both problematic forms of general jurisdiction based
14 See Freidrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction,2001 U Chi

Legal F 141, 161-63 (discussing why broad, sweeping American-style general jurisdiction
conflicts with the jurisdictional bases recognized by other countries).
15 See, for example, Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in InternationalCriminal Law?,

93 Am J Intl L 452, 455-56 & nn 25-27 (1999) (discussing the use of universal jurisdiction
for the prosecution of international crimes and providing examples).
16 495 US 604, 607-08 (1990) (holding that a California court had personal jurisdiction in a divorce action over a New Jersey resident who was served with process while
temporarily in California for activities unrelated to the suit).
17 342 US 437, 447-48 (1952) (assessing whether "the business done in Ohio by the
respondent mining company was sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to permit
Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a foreign corporation, where the cause of action
arose from activities entirely distinct from its activities in Ohio," and concluding that
'under the circumstances ... it would not violate federal due process for Ohio either to
take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation in this proceeding").
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solely on presence, although most of the panelists have addressed
only the pervasive-contacts form here."'
All the panelists seem to agree that this form of general jurisdiction is problematic, although they differ in their conclusions
about whether to abandon it. Dean Borchers sees the doctrine as
an unfortunate but necessary gap-filler for inadequacies in specific jurisdiction.19 Professor Twitchell, similarly, sees general
jurisdiction as a necessary evil; in a system wrought with unpredictable rules, it is the one easily predictable principle. ° Professor
Juenger seemed prepared to limit the doctrine to permitting general jurisdiction only in the defendant's home state.21
As Professor Juenger explained, general jurisdiction is derived from the power premise of Pennoyer,22 under which the exclusive test for state authority is the presence of the defendant or
his property at the time of the litigation.2 3 Ironicallyi while Justice Field derived this standard of jurisdictional reasonableness
from international norms (perhaps erroneously, it appears 24 ), it is
precisely this jurisdictional base which now appears to appall the
rest of the world. 25 This principle transformed into a "contactsbased" justification in response to the rise of the corporate form.
Without the tangible form of a body, corporations did not fit into
the Pennoyer model of jurisdiction based on a defendant's location. Thus, "contacts" evolved as a jurisdictional proxy: we can see
the corporate footprints, even if we can not see the feet. We treat
the corporate defendant as "present" for Pennoyer purposes-that
is, subject to all-purpose judicial authority-whenever there are
lots of long-standing footprints.
18

But see Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Juris-

diction, 2001 U Chi Legal F 171, 179-81 (discussing jurisdiction based on transient service
under Burnham).
19 Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U Chi Legal F
119, 129-30 ("IC]urrent specific jurisdiction doctrine contains several irrational elements,
some of which make general jurisdiction an unpleasant necessity.").
20 Twitchell, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 171 (cited in note 18) (revising her previous position advocating "cutting back on 'doing-business' general jurisdiction, [and] limiting it to
the place of incorporation and the defendant's principal place of business").
21 Juenger, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 159, (cited in note 14) (arguing that total elimination of general jurisdiction would "pour the baby out with the bath water").
22 95 US at 723-24 ("Where a party is within a territory, he may justly be subject to
its process, and bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such process against
him.") (citation omitted).
23 Juenger, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 145-49 (cited in note 14).
24 See id at 146-47 (suggesting English law no longer recognized tag jurisdiction at
the time Pennoyer was decided).
25 See id at 161-62 (discussing the "blacklisting" of general jurisdiction under Article
18 of the Hague Draft Proposal).
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So what is the problem? When the defendant has demonstrated long-standing connection with the state, what is wrong
with forcing him to litigate there? Litigation is not likely to be
terribly inconvenient for a defendant who is in the forum continuously. Why is this so different from citizenship-based authority, which is universally accepted?
Professor Twitchell has suggested that the difference may be
a matter of proportionality: the burdens of subjecting a noncitizen defendant to general jurisdiction may exceed any benefit
obtained from even continuous contact with the forum.2 6 I must
admit that I have always viewed the quid pro quo rationale for
any assertion of jurisdiction as highly suspect.27 Unlike Professor
Twitchell, I see no greater proportionality justification in assertions of specific jurisdiction.28 That is to say, the burden of defending litigation in any particular case may far outweigh whatever
benefits a defendant obtained from his related contacts with the
state. The imbalance between benefits and burdens in general
jurisdiction does not strike me as any more unconscionable. Indeed, I would think there is likely to be greater proportionality in
the case of general jurisdiction than specific.29
Professor Lea Brilmayer has suggested that the difference
might be understood in terms of democratic theory. Citizens of a
state have a voice in the political process, whereas outsiders do
not: "The basic inquiry must be whether the defendant's level of
activity rises to the level of activity of an insider, so that relegat26 Twitchell, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 175-76 (cited in note 18) (arguing that unlike
specific jurisdiction "[tihere is [ I no equivalent proportionality for an activities-based
general jurisdiction. Regular and continuous activity in the forum may benefit the defendant in many regards, but this alone does not justify the burden of unlimited jurisdictional
exposure in that forum.").
27 See Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 734-38 (cited in note 6) (discussing purposeful availment rationales); Allan R. Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal
Jurisdiction,22 Rutgers L J 597, 605 (1991) (discussing Justice Scalia's critique of purposeful availment in Burnham).
28 It seems to me Professor Twitchell begs the question when she concludes that "[a]
quid pro quo justification works well for specific jurisdiction" because 'a defendant that
actively markets its products to other states should expect to be subjected to suits there
arising from injuries caused by defective products." Twitchell, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 175
(cited in note 18). Although she may be right that the assertion of jurisdiction does not
come as a surprise to a defendant, I question whether that is a function of a fair exchange
of benefits for burdens.
29 The courts have exercised specific jurisdiction where it was hard to see any benefit
inuring to a defendant by virtue of his contacts with the forum. See, for example, Calder v
Jones, 465 US 783, 784-86 (1984) (subjecting the author of a defamatory article about a
California resident to jurisdiction in California notwithstanding his lack of any direct
personal contact with the state).
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ing the defendant to the political process is fair."3 ' Thus, it is

more problematic to assert jurisdiction over outsiders, at least
until they obtain insider-like participation in the polity.
The democratic theory rationale strikes me as closer to the
mark, yet still unsatisfactory. Many "insiders" (prisoners, for example) have no meaningful voice in political deliberations. 1 Yet
we would not hesitate to assert general jurisdiction over such
citizen-defendants. Conversely, mere participation in a state's
political processes seems to be an inadequate predicate for general jurisdiction. It is difficult to imagine that any court would
assert general jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation that
merely poured millions of dollars into a state to influence a referendum but did not otherwise conduct business there. More fundamentally, Brilmayer's theory fails to account for the jurisdiction of non-democratic sovereigns altogether. Do monarchies or
dictatorships that do not permit meaningful citizen participation
in the political process lack legitimate general jurisdiction (by
U.S. jurisdictional standards) over their citizens? Could such a
state legitimately assert jurisdiction over outsiders who have the
same, negligible influence on the political processes? Remember
that the Court in Pennoyer purported to base its jurisdictional
norms on "well-established principles of public law."32 The due

process protection the Court was extending was not based on the
peculiar nature of the American government, but rather on its
perception of an international standard of legitimacy.
Nonetheless, I share the panelists' intuition that there is a
problem with the doctrine of general jurisdiction, and I share Professor Brilmayer's intuition that a state has a different kind of
authority over citizens than non-citizens. While we have some
sense that our "home" state-our "king"-may have authority
over us regardless of where we have acted, we do not owe the
same universal allegiance to other states that we merely visiteven those we visit frequently or in which we may wield significant political influence. A citizen's relationship with his sovereign
is uniquely non-territorial. The singularity of that relationship is
underscored by the principle that a person can have only a single
30

Lea Brilmayer, et al, A General Look at General Jurisdiction,66 Tex L Rev 723, 742

(1988).
31 See Brian J. Hancock, The Voting Rights of Convicted Felons, 17 Fed Election
Commission J Election Admin 35, 39 (1996) (discussing criminal disenfranchisement);
Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting
Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 Yale L J 537, 538-39 (1993) (same).
32 95 US at 722.
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"domicile" at any given time and does not lose that domicile until
a new one is acquired.3 I am not prepared to say that one can
never form a "citizen-like" relationship with multiple sovereigns,
but mere "continuous and systematic activity" does not begin to
capture this citizen-like relationship.
This emphasis on the unique nature of citizenship admittedly
may have more resonance for individuals than for corporations,
and more resonance internationally than domestically. Our conceptions of corporate citizenship tend to be fairly mechanical,3 4
and we do not have a very robust sense of state citizenship.3 5 But
even on a state level, I think we see a difference between citizenship and frequent-visitor status that goes beyond issuance of
drivers' licenses.
This point comes into stark relief if we consider legislative
rather than judicial authority. Imagine that Roe v Wade3" has
been overturned, and a state where abortion is illegal passes a
law forbidding its citizens from having an abortion in another
state. The legitimacy of such a law would at least be a close call: 7
33 See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 11(2) (1971) ("Every person has a
domicil at all times and, at least for the same purpose, no person has more than one domicil at a time."); White v Tennant, 8 SE 596, 597 (W Va 1888) ("A domicile once acquired
remains until a new one is acquired elsewhere, facto et animo."). As Professor Weintraub
has pointed out, the definition of "domicile" may well vary according to its legal context.
See Russell J. Weintraub, Commentarieson the Conflict of Laws § 2.16 (Foundation 4th ed

1986). Thus, a definition of domicile for the purpose of ascertaining diversity jurisdiction
serves a different function than for conflict-of-laws purposes, and domicile for the purpose
of ascertaining tax liability may differ from domicile for purposes of selecting a tort liability rule. It is noteworthy that the courts seem to follow the principle of exclusivity in all
contexts, at least as far as individuals are concerned. See id at § 2.5.
34 See, for example, 28 USC § 1332(c)(1) (1994) (defining corporate citizenship for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction as both the place of incorporation and principal place of
business). Notwithstanding the duality of corporate, compared to individual, citizenship,
courts exhibit a notable obstinacy in insisting that a corporation can have only one principal place of business. This may evince a sentiment similar to that animating the single
citizenship rule for individuals, in other words, the unique nature of a citizen's relationship to its sovereign. See Charles Alan Wright, et al, 13B Federal Practiceand Procedure:
Jurisdiction§ 3624 (West 2d ed 1984).
35 See Linda Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-

of-Law Constraintsafter Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 Hofstra L Rev 103, 104-19
(1982) (criticizing the Court's extension of jurisdiction in Allstate Insurance Co v Hague,
449 US 302 (1981), and suggesting that limitations are necessary to avoid "state parochialism").
36 410 US 113 (1973).
37 Consider Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to

Life, and the Right to Die, 91 Mich L Rev 873 (1993) (discussing the extra-territorial regulation of abortion); Seth F. Kramer, "But Whoever Treasures Freedom...": The Right to
Travel and ExtraterritorialAbortions, 91 Mich L Rev 907 (1993) (same); Gerald L. Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions? No Thanks: A Response to Professors Brilmayer and

Kramer, 91 Mich L Rev 939 (1993) (same). See also Child Sexual Abuse Prevention Act, 18
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"States do possess the power to regulate their citizens' conduct in
other states in the usual case."38 However, it is unimaginable that
the state could apply that law to someone who merely maintained
a vacation home in the state, even one that she visited regularly.39 There is, in this sense, a serious authority problem with
general jurisdiction over non-citizens.
Moreover, imposing on a party multiple "all-purpose" obligations of allegiance creates serious inequities in the litigation
process. Given our commitment to honoring the plaintiff's choice
of forum, general jurisdiction unbalances the scales of justice. It
permits plaintiffs to obtain the upper hand by shopping for the
most favorable forum.4 ° One critical difference between citizenship and general jurisdiction is that citizenship limits a defendant's jurisdictional exposure to one (or at most two) places. Both
pervasive contacts and transient service on individuals multiply
geometrically the number of possible forums where a defendant,
particularly large corporate defendants in the case of pervasive
contacts, may be sued. And that is the rub.
Forum shopping has two kinds of effects, both of which present problems. The first is manipulation of the law applied to the
controversy. A breakdown in the uniformity of approaches to
choice-of-law has accompanied the expansion of personal jurisdiction over the last fifty years. This variety of conflicts approaches
enables a plaintiff to manipulate the law applied in a given case
by selecting the forum based on its choice-of-law rules.41 There
USC § 2423(b) (1994) (criminalizing travel by U.S. citizens to foreign countries for the
purpose of engaging in sexual relations with person under the age of eighteen).
38 Brilmayer, 91 Mich L Rev at 873 (cited in note 37).
39 But see Allstate Insurance Co v Hague, 449 US 302, 313-14 (1981) (noting, among
other things, the forum state's interest in regulating out-of-state conduct of an insurance
company doing business in Minnesota as a justification for the application of Minnesota
law). Admittedly, subjecting a party to multiple legal rules is far more problematic than
subjecting them to multiple litigation forums. Subjecting a party to multiple legal standards can create debilitating uncertainty. Indeed, the major impetus behind the single
domicile rule is that "some. . . legal interests should at all times be determined by a single
law." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 11 comment c (1971). Exposure to multiple litigation forums under the general jurisdiction doctrine does create the same kind of
bind. It can, nonetheless, have dramatic impact on choice of law, as I detail below. See text
accompanying notes 40-48.
40 For a general discussion, see Eugene F. Scoles and Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws 5167 (West 2d ed 1992) (describing how the plaintiff's characterization of a case can shape
the outcome of the litigation).
41 See, for example, Kozoway v Massey-Ferguson,Inc, 722 F Supp 641 (D Colo 1989).
In Kozoway, a Canadian plaintiff injured in Canada by a hay baler manufactured in Iowa
sued defendant, a Maryland corporation, in Colorado, where defendant was subject to
general jurisdiction. Id at 641-42. Had suit been filed in Iowa, the court would have applied Canadian law under its "place of injury" conflict-of-laws rule. Id at 643. Canadian
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are, as Professor Borchers points out, constitutional limits on
those choices, and a state with no other connection to the controversy would be hard-pressed to justify applying its own law.4 2
But even where the applicable substantive law would not be
affected by the choice of forum, that choice can carry other significant advantages. First, constitutional due process limits on
choice of substantive law are apparently irrelevant to a state's
selection of its own procedural law. Thus, in Sun Oil Co v Wortman,43 Kansas was permitted to apply its long statute of limitations to a claim lacking any significant connection with the
state. 4 Because the defendant maintained systematic contacts
with Kansas (as it presumably did with all fifty states), the plaintiff was able to shop for an extremely long statute of limitations.4 5
Moreover, a forum is always entitled to apply its own choice-oflaw rules even when it would not be permitted to apply its own
substantive law, 46 and that choice can confer substantial benefits
on a party.4 v
Even where the formal legal rules are unaffected by the forum choice, other forum characteristics can put plaintiffs at a
significant advantage; the availability and sympathy of juries,
discovery, and contingent fees all vary significantly from state to
state. 4' General jurisdiction gives plaintiffs the ability to take advantage of all such differences.
Perhaps a subtler problem with these remedial differences
concerns the allocation of authority among the potential forum
states. The doctrine permits the forum state to set standards of
care, assess responsibility, and award damages in a matter in
which it has no regulatory stake. While it may do so under the
guise of applying another state's law, the judge and jury are
law did not provide for strict liability. Colorado, in contrast, applied Iowa strict liability
law pursuant to Colorado's "most significant relationship" conflicts rule. Id. The case is
discussed in Linda J. Silberman and Allan R. Stein, Civil Procedure-Theoryand Practice

230-31 (Aspen 2001).
42 Borchers, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 132 & nn 82-83 (cited in note 19) (suggesting that
the Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment may play a role in limiting a plaintiffs
choice of forum).
43 486 US 717 (1988).
44 Id at 722.

45 Id. See also Ferens v John Deere Co, 494 US 516, 531 (1990) (mandating application
of Mississippi statute of limitations to Pennsylvania-based claims transferred from Mississippi to Pennsylvania on plaintiffs motion pursuant to 28 USC § 1406).
46 See Day & Zimmermann, Inc v Challoner, 423 US 3, 4-5 (1975) (applying Texas
conflict-of-laws rule notwithstanding the absence of any Texas interest in the underlying
dispute).
47 See note 41 and accompanying text.
48 See Silberman and Stein, Civil Procedureat 218 (cited in note 41).
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drawn from the wrong political community. The forum is thus
illegitimately appropriating the sovereign prerogative of another
state.
It is this subtler form of regulatory poaching that concerns
the Universal Jurisdiction panelists.
2. Universal jurisdiction.
Internationalists may find jarring my reference to universal
jurisdiction as "presence-based." The doctrine is a principle of
international law permitting a state to prosecute a defendant for
certain predicate crimes even in the absence of any connection
between the forum state and the crime.49 In what way is that related to general jurisdiction and other presence-based jurisdictional justifications?
The answer is that the jurisdictional predicate for the prosecution is mere custody over the defendant." The state can obtain
custody either when the defendant enters its territory or by seeking extradition pursuant to a treaty with another state that has
physical custody.5 1 Effectively, the doctrine permits a state with
only presence-based jurisdictional authority to regulate through
criminal prosecution extraterritorial behavior that does not implicate its domestic interests. Accordingly, it is as much presence
as universal jurisdiction which does the heavy lifting in allocating
authority among sovereigns. Universal jurisdiction thus shares
with general jurisdiction the quality of allowing a defendant's

49 Consider Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw, 66
Tex L Rev 785 (1988).
50 See, for example, Code de Procedure Pdnale Art 689-2, translated in The French

Code of CriminalProcedure(Rothman rev ed 1988) (Gerald L. Kock and Richard S. Frase
trans), which provides that a perpetrator of torture outside of France "may be prosecuted
and tried by French courts if he is found in France." See also Canadian Criminal Code, SC
2000, ch 24, § 8(b) (requiring defendants' presence in Canada for prosecutions of crimes
against humanity). Some scholars have read the Belgium Act as permitting Belgian prosecutions even without the presence of the defendant. See Luc Reydams, Universal Criminal
Jurisdiction:The Belgian State of Affairs, 1 Crim L F 183, 190-91 (2000); M. Cherif Bassiouni, UniversalJurisdictionin HistoricalPerspective: UniversalJurisdictionTheory and
Practicefrom PiracyProsecutions to the Present 68 in Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction (2001) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. For a comprehensive review of universal
jurisdiction implementing statutes, see A. Hays Butler, Universal Jurisdiction:A Survey
of Enabling Statutes (unpublished manuscript) [on file with U Chi Legal F].
51 See, for example, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 ILM 1027 (1984), amended at 24 ILM 535 (1985);
International Convention On Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, GA
Res 28/3068, UN GAOR, 28th Sess, Supp No 30, 75, UN Doc AIRes/28/3068 (1973), reprinted in 13 ILM 50 (1974).
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body to become the jurisdictional predicate of what might be seen
as extraterritorial meddling.
Most of the panelists seem to agree that this is normatively
undesirable. I am enough of a positivist to share Professor
Rubin's skepticism" of the description of the predicate crimes as
"universal norms, " and enough of a pragmatist to worry about
the impact of international prosecutions on the ability of states to
rid themselves of despots. 3 On the other hand, I wonder whether
such a threat might deter despotic behavior in the first place.54
What I find intriguing here, however, is the contrast with
general jurisdiction. As the General Jurisdiction Panel noted, the
pervasive contacts approach has been fairly universally condemned outside of the United States; indeed, the use of pervasive
contacts as a basis for jurisdiction seems to have been the central
obstacle to a Hague judgments convention.5 In contrast, universal jurisdiction is a fairly well-established, albeit contestable,
principle of international law.56 Given that both are premised on
52 Alfred P. Rubin, Is International Criminal Law "Universal"?,2001 U Chi Legal F
351, 358-64 (viewing with skepticism the claim that there are "universal" norms that may
be enforced through universal jurisdiction).
53 See Henry A. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,80 Foreign Affairs
86, 96 (July/Aug 2001) (concluding that the pursuit of universal jurisdiction as evidenced
in the Pinochet case "could threaten the very purpose for which the concept has been developed"); Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute
InternationalCrimes in Haiti?,31 Tex Intl L J 1, 5-6 (1996) (critically evaluating the U.S.
role in helping bring an end to the human rights abuses of the Haitian military regime by
offering amnesty to military leaders); Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 Am J Intl L 500, 505 (1994) (noting the value of waiving prosecution for war
crimes as a "bargaining chip" in peace negotiations).
64 See David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of InternationalJustice,
23 Fordham Intl L J 473, 476-88 (1999) (examining the deterrence value of international
prosecution of human rights violations); Antonio F. Perez, The Perils of Pinochet: Problems for TransitionalJustice and SupranationalGovernance Solution, 28 Denver J Intl L
& Pol 175, 179 (2000) (recognizing the increased deterrence caused by the extradition
proceedings and arrest of Pinochet); Gautam Rana, ... And Justice for All: Normative
Descriptive Frameworksfor the Implementation of Tribunals To Try Human Rights Violators, 30 Vand J Transnatl L 349, 355 (1997) ('The main reason for criminally punishing
human rights violators is that by doing so the international community will deter future
repression.").
55 See Linda J. Silberman, Can the Hague JudgmentsProject Be Saved?: A Perspective
from the United States, in John J. Barcel6, III and Kevin M. Clermont, eds, A Global Law
of Jurisdictionand Judgments: Lessons from The Hague (forthcoming Kluwer Intl 2001).
See also Juenger, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 161-62 (cited in note 14) ("American-style 'doingbusiness' general jurisdiction... struck the delegates from other countries represented in
the Hague Conference as sufficiently exorbitant to merit blacklisting.").
56 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 (1987) provides that:

A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern,
such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide,
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a presence-based jurisdictional justification, how are we to understand the rejection of one and acceptance of the other?
The obvious, but nevertheless important, answer is that the
problem of "extraterritorial meddling" is significantly alleviated
in the universal jurisdiction context by at least the appearance
that the forum state is doing the world's bidding. 7 The forum
state cannot be accused of extraterritorial meddling because the
state where the crime was committed can have no proper autonomy interest in legitimating the underlying behavior.
Here is the critical insight to draw from these cases that will
inform our understanding of jurisdiction generally: sovereignty in
an interconnected world is not a-substantive. In order to test a
sovereign prerogative, one needs to know what the sovereign is
trying to do, not simply where. Interference with behavior that
serves no legitimate domestic purpose is far less problematic than
regulation that simply seeks to replace one regulatory preference
with another. International law scholars will hardly be stunned
by this insight, for it is one of the central premises of international law. It is less obviously part of American domestic jurisdictional consciousness. This principle is, nevertheless, embedded in
our jurisdictional rules, and that can be gleaned from the internet
cases.
B. Effects-Based Authority
Like purely presence-based authority, effects-based or regulatory claims of authority create the risk that multiple sovereign
authorities will assert control over the same activity. Effectsbased claims are even more prone to multiple regulatory claims
than presence-based claims, since the jurisdictional predicate of
presence is something of a limiting principle; only those states
with significant connections with the defendant are empowered.
As the two Cyberspace Panels demonstrate, the number of regulatory claims that states merely affected by extraterritorial behavior could bring is potentially enormous.

war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the
bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present.
57 See Randall, 66 Tex L Rev at 831-32 (cited in note 49) (discussing the theory that

defendants in universal jurisdiction prosecutions are "hostis humani generis" or "enemies
of mankind").
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1. Internet regulation.
The central challenge of regulatory or effects-based justifications is the search for a limiting principle. What stops a state
from regulating globally any conduct that causes some effect in
the forum? The internet problems suggest three separate but interdependent limiting principles: (1) behavior targeted at the affected state is more amenable to extraterritorial regulation than
untargeted behavior-that is to say, behavior that has an effect
on a state, but was not directed toward that state; (2) socially
valuable behavior is less subject to extraterritorial interference
than purely destructive behavior (the principle previously drawn
from the presence-based cases); and (3) the more serious the domestic effect, the greater the extraterritorial regulatory authority
of the affected state.
These principles are quite explicit components of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine applied in American Libraries
Association v Pataki" to invalidate a New York law criminalizing
digital dissemination of sexually-oriented materials deemed
harmful to minors, including transmission over the internet. 9
The court in Pataki reasoned that out-of-state actors would be
unduly constrained because of the uncontrollable consequence
that material posted by them might be accessed in New York. °
Such a burden on interstate commerce exceeded any local benefit
derived from the regulation.'
Professors Goldsmith and Sykes have criticized Pataki for
what they view as a sloppy cost-benefit analysis. 2 They argue
that the court was unduly concerned with the mere underinclusiveness of the regulation, 3 and that out-of-state actors have
more control over the dissemination of their material than the
court appreciated. 4 Their criticisms are well-taken. Pataki nonetheless represents a conceptual breakthrough in the problem of
allocating jurisdiction over behavior that has multi-state impact.
58

969 F Supp 160 (S D NY 1997).

59 Id at 177.

Id at 177-79.
Id at 179 ("Balanced against the limited local benefits resulting from the Act is an
extreme burden on interstate commerce."). The court also noted the substantial underinclusiveness of the regulation: the Act did not cover pornography posted from a foreign
country and covered only pictorial, not verbal, postings. See id at 178-79.
62 Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 Yale L J 785, 814-18 (2001).
63 Id at 814.
64 Id at 815-16 (noting the ability of web site operators to verify a viewer's age
through a credit card or adult identification code).
60
61
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In particular, it made explicit factors implicit in, but not addressed by prior attempts to allocate jurisdiction over internetrelated activity.
Courts' prior experience in allocating authority over internetrelated behavior has come largely in the personal jurisdiction
context. While there is considerable consistency in the outcomes,65
there is a conflict (particularly in Lanham Act cases) over
whether mere dissemination of actionable material in the forum
is a sufficient jurisdictional predicate.6 Rather than simply argue
about whether mere effects in the forum are a sufficient jurisdictional predicate, Pataki offers us a more refined analysis, taking
into account the severity of the effects, the value of the defendant's behavior, and the degree to which the forum's assertion of
jurisdiction impacts out-of-state behavior. Pataki recognizes that
assertions of state authority must be evaluated not simply by
looking at the relationship between the defendant and the forum,
but in consideration of the impact of a state's assertion of authority on other state's regulatory preferences. While one may quarrel
with the court's execution, it seemed to be asking the right questions.
The courts have not used the Commerce Clause to test excessive assertions of judicial authority for almost seventy years,67 but
there is no reason its application should be so limited. Indeed, at
one time the Court experimented with limiting personal jurisdiction through the application of Commerce Clause principles," but

65 See Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32
Intl Lawyer 1167, 1179-91 (1998).
66 Compare Bensusan Restaurant Corp v King, 937 F Supp 295, 301 (S D NY 1996),

affd 126 F3d 25 (2d Cir 1997) (finding no jurisdiction) and HearstCorp v Goldberger, 1997
US Dist Lexis 2065, *66 (S D NY) (same), with Hasbro Inc v Clue Computing Inc, 994 F
Supp 34, 47 (D Mass 1997) (upholding jurisdiction) and Inset Systems, Inc v Instruction
Set, Inc, 937 F Supp 161, 164-65 (D Conn 1996) (same).
67 In InternationalMilling Co v Columbia Co, 292 US 511, 517 (1934), the Supreme
Court declared Davis v Farmers Co-Operative Equity Co, 262 US 312 (1923), which had
been the primary authority for viewing excessive assertion of jurisdiction as violative of
the Commerce Clause, to be "confined narrowly within the bounds of its own facts."
68 In Farmers Co-Operative, 262 US at 317-18, the Court employed the Commerce
Clause to deny jurisdiction because "orderly, effective administration of justice clearly
[did] not require that a foreign carrier shall submit to a suit in a State in which the cause
of action did not arise, in which the transaction giving rise to it was not entered upon, in
which the carrier neither owns nor operates a railroad, and in which the plaintiff does not
reside." Id at 317. See also Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co v Terte, 284 US 284,
287 (1932) (holding that the exercise of jurisdiction was improper as an undue burden
upon interstate commerce).
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ultimately opted to use the Due Process Clause instead.69 Assertions of judicial authority can burden interstate behavior as much
as applying a state's substantive law. A defendant fearful of being
haled into a distant court could well be chilled from exercising its
internet speech. Overly aggressive assertions of personal jurisdiction in internet cases may again lead the courts down the Commerce Clause path.
But I want to make a broader claim: the propriety of asserting personal jurisdiction cannot be separated from the question of
extraterritorial effects, and such a consideration is already implicit in the Court's Due Process jurisprudence." In World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp v Woodson,7 the Court rejected an attempt by
Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction over a New York defendant that
was responsible for the sale of an allegedly defective automobile
driven by the plaintiffs to Oklahoma." Central to the Court's
analysis was the extraterritorial spillover: "The Due Process
Clause ...allows potential defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where what conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit."73 As I have argued
elsewhere, that autonomy-related concern ultimately is based not
merely on a theory of predictability but also on the impropriety of
Oklahoma's interference with defendant's conduct in New York.74
The defendant could have structured its primary conduct to avoid
out-of-state jurisdiction: it could have not sold automobiles in
New York. The problem is that Oklahoma has no business interfering with that kind of New York activity in these circumstances-that is, where Oklahoma's regulatory claim was undifferentiated ex ante from any other state's." Thus, Oklahoma's
assertion ofjurisdiction undermined the sovereignty of New York:
"Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigation before the tribunals of another
State ...the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its

69 For a general discussion, see Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdictionof State Courtsfrom Pennoyer to Denckla: A
Review, 25 U Chi L Rev 569 (1958).
70 See Stein, 32 Intl Lawyer at 1179-91 (cited in note 65); Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 71160 (cited in note 6).
71 444 US 286 (1980).
72 See id at 296-99.
73 Id at 297.
74 See Stein, 32 Intl Lawyer at 1183 (cited in note 65).
75 See Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 749-51 (cited in note 6).
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terstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
power to render a valid judgment.""6
In other cases in which the underlying conduct had less legitimate local value, the Court has been far less solicitous of the
spillover consequences of assertions of extraterritorial authority.
Thus, in Calder v Jones,77 the Court upheld California's assertion
of jurisdiction over a Florida defendant who wrote a defamatory
article about actress Shirley Jones, notwithstanding any purposive act on defendant's part to direct his actions toward California, the state of the plaintiff's residence.78
Thus, the courts have been more reluctant to sustain jurisdiction where they see the defendant as having engaged in a legitimate domestic activity than in cases in which they perceive
the defendant as having targeted intentional wrongdoing toward
the forum. Only in the former class of cases are the courts concerned about extraterritorial spillover effects. Making this distinction explicit can only help to bring greater consistency and
coherence to the decision-making.
The Commerce Clause spillover principles, I think, work reasonably well for limiting both legislative and judicial jurisdiction.
First, the targeted principle (expressed in the Commerce Clause
cases as a concern about "burdening" interstate behavior) is a
more appropriate tool than "purposeful availment"' 9 to redress
both comity and defendant autonomy concerns. It redefines the
issue as one of regulatory precision and proportionality rather
than one of quid pro quo.8" A state exercises legitimate authority
76 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 294.
77 465 US 783 (1984).
78

See id at 789.

79 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 298 (finding jurisdiction is proper when "a

corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State'"), quoting Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 253 (1958).
80 The frequently invoked justification for assertions of jurisdiction under the purposeful availment test is that the defendant has been compensated for the burden of jurisdiction by receiving a benefit from its contacts with the forum. See, for example, Burger
King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476 (1985) ("[Blecause defendant's activities are
shielded by 'the benefits and protections' of the forum's laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.").
See also InternationalShoe, 326 US at 319:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and,
so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to
a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be
undue.

373] JURISDICTION: FROM ISOLATION TO CONNECTEDNESS

393

over a defendant when its regulatory interest is differentiated ex
ante from those of other states. Where behavior is targeted at a
state, that state's regulation of the behavior will have a minimal
spillover on the regulatory interests of other states, and the defendant can control his amenability to jurisdiction.
A focus on regulatory precision also lends itself to flexibility
in the face of technological change. The technology of the internet, while itself significantly contributing to jurisdictional chaos,
also offers the best hope for rationalizing interstate regulation.
As Lawrence Lessig has pointed out, while the internet currently
employs an architecture which maintains anonymity and makes
state-specific controls difficult, that architecture is changing.8 1
Specifically, the use of digital certificates will enable internet actors to know, at little or no cost, with whom they are communicating. This technology thus offers a mechanism for a state to regulate extraterritorial behavior that has a state-specific impact
without burdening extraterritorial behavior that does not have
such impact.8 2 For example, a state wanting to prevent its citizens
from gambling could require an out-of-state virtual casino to
forego transactions with its citizens. Such a state would thereby
advance its legitimate territorial interests with minimal burden
on other extraterritorial behavior.
This justification has been roundly criticized as an "unconscionable" deal. See, for example, Burnham, 495 US at 624 (suggesting that transient service could not be justified
under and benefits-burdens rationale); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process,
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 S Ct Rev 77, 87-88, 96 (arguing that

"[wihen the State bases jurisdiction on related contacts, it is merely requiring the defendant to bear the costs arising out of occurrences in the forum," but "requiring [an out-ofstate] defendant to litigate in the forum is an impermissible means of regulating substantively relevant impact there where the defendant had no control over the location of the
impact, because the result is that the plaintiffs option to litigate in a convenient place is
paid by out-of-state consumers"); Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 700 (cited in note 6):
If jurisdiction rests on consent, then the inquiry should focus on whether
the consent was in truth voluntary. If, alternatively, jurisdiction requires
a substantively fair exchange, then the inquiry should be whether the exchange of benefits for burdens was equitable. The Court, however, never
resolved that ambiguity. As a consequence, the application of the exchange rationale became a mechanical exercise divorced from its underlying justification.
81 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 38-39, 49-53 (Basic 1999)
(discussing how the internet is now building architecture of identification, such as digital
certificates, to authenticate personal facts). See also Goldsmith and Sykes, 110 Yale L J at
809-13 (cited in note 62) (suggesting that web content providers can control flows on the
internet by using identification technologies that, although currently imperfect, will likely
"be precise ard inexpensive in the near future").
82 Consider Goldsmith and Sykes, 110 Yale L J at 809-10 (cited in note 62) (pointing
out how internet content providers currently can verify age).
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As Pataki suggests, 3 the value of the regulated activity is
also relevant. We are not worried about "burdening" extraterritorial behavior that has little value. (This, again, is a variation on
the universal jurisdiction principle.) Consider a web page that
had, as its sole purpose, the dissemination of a destructive computer virus to any browser that connects to it. It would be difficult to imagine anyone worrying about the spillover effects of
regulation by virtually any affected state. Nor can one imagine
anyone sympathizing with the culprit's plea that he was unable
to control where the virus spread.
The preceding leads us to one of the central riddles of jurisdiction, particularly as I have constructed it here: how can we
make sense of rules allocating jurisdiction which themselves turn
on normative judgments about the legitimacy of the substantive
laws in question? Do we not need to know who has authority to
make those judgments? Does it make any sense to test a French
claim to regulate sale of Nazi memorabilia in the United States
by looking at the social value of those sales? Is that not exactly
what is at issue?
My answer is that it does make sense. Many of the contributors to this Symposium have commented on our interconnected
world. It is surely more interconnected in the sense that actions
in one place have greater effects elsewhere than they had previously. But it is interconnected in another way as well: governments recognize that they can no longer operate in isolation from
other governments. They recognize that their citizens encounter
multiple sources of law, and states are increasingly cooperating
with each other to provide an effective legal order. As demonstrated by the proposed Hague Convention, 4 even the United
States wants to connect its judicial system to a wider legal regime. Law is developing its own network; nations are coordinating and sharing their authority.
As demonstrated by our own history, joining a legal network
carries with it benefits and burdens. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause empowered states to have their judgments enforced in

83 See text accompanying notes 58-66.
84 See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Hague Draft
Proposal") (adopted Oct 30, 1999) available online at <http://hcch.nete/conventions/
draft36e.html> (visited Oct 22, 2001).
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other states. 5 But the Clause carried with it a concomitant obligation of respect and self-restraint. Pennoyer was quite explicitly

a command to Oregon to limit its jurisdictional claims by respecting the sovereignty of other states in the network. As my mother
would put it, "Keep your elbows in, you're at the table."

This, I think, is the essential meaning of comity: respect for a
different legal ordering. As a jurisdiction-mediating principle,
this translates into a sensitivity toward both competing regulatory preferences and the impact of effects-based authority on
those competing preferences.
Introducing comity into the jurisdictional equation will not be
simple. One state's extraterritorial meddling is another's domestic regulation. Consider, for example, the Yahoo! case. 6 In May,
2000, French courts enjoined Yahoo!, a U.S. web site operator,
from offering French citizens Nazi memorabilia for sale on its
U.S. web auction site. 7 Specifically, the French court ordered Yahoo! to engineer their web site to facilitate recognition of French
IP addresses and bar access to its websites from those addresses.88 The court also ordered Yahoo! to require a declaration
of nationality from users with nationally ambiguous IP ad89
dresses.
From the French perspective, the United States could be seen
to be engaging in extraterritorial meddling by promoting (or at

least permitting) local activity that causes extraterritorial harm
in France. Conversely, the French prosecution was seen from the

85 US Const Art IV, § 1. See, for example, Fauntleroy v Lum, 210 US 230, 237 (1908)
(holding that even a mistaken application of Mississippi law by a Missouri court nevertheless was entitled to enforcement in Mississippi).
86 Yahoo!, Inc, v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F Supp 2d 1168
(N D Cal 2001).
87 Id at 1172. Following issuance of the French injunction, Yahoo! filed suit in the
Northern District of California to enjoin the French plaintiffs-the Union des Etudiants
Juifs de France ("UEJF') and the Ligue Contre le Racisme et L' Antisdmitisme
(MLICRA')-from enforcing the French injunction. The court denied the motion of the
UEJF and LICRA to dismiss the California action for lack of personal jurisdiction on June
7, 2001. Id. The court recently granted Yahoo!'s motion for summary judgment in the
California proceeding and issued a declaratory judgment that the First Amendment would
preclude enforcement of the French judgment within the United States. Yahoo!, Inc v La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 2001 US Dist Lexis 18378, *36-37 (N D Cal).
See also Mahasti Razavi and Thaima Samman, Yahoo! and Limitations of the Global
Village, 19 Communications Lawyer 27, 27-31 (2001) (describing the chronology of events
and legal implications of the Yahoo! case).
88 145 F Supp 2d at 1172. In November, 2000, the French Court "reaffirmed" its Order
of May, 2000. See id.
89

Id.
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U.S. perspective as an illegitimate attempt to regulate conduct in
the United States. 90
I do not know that putting comity on the jurisdictional scales
requires us to identify which country is "poaching," that is, infringing on the sovereign regulatory prerogatives of another
state. Rather, what courts ought to look for is some possibility of
accommodation, as the French Court arguably did in the Yahoo!
case. The court did not prohibit Yahoo! from offering the material
on its web sites. 91 Nor did it impose strict liability on Yahoo! for
disseminating the material to any French citizen. Rather, it imposed filtering requirements on Yahoo! that it perceived to be
relatively modest, particularly given the financial resources of the
defendant. 2 This was clearly a court, like Pataki, trying to balance its domestic regulatory needs against the spillover costs on
other states that may not share its regulatory preferences.93
Had the Yahoo! court imposed a more extensive restraint on
the defendant, forbidding any sale of Nazi memorabilia to prevent
absolutely exposure of the material to French citizens, the effect
of that remedy on U.S. regulatory policy-namely, free speech on
the internet-would have been significant. The remedy the
French court in fact imposed might not be quite as airtight, but
the cost of marginal under-enforcement to French policy is significantly lower than the alternative cost of over-enforcement to
U.S. regulatory policy.
90 See, for example, Lisa Guernsey, Welcome to the Web. Passport,Please?,New York
Times G1 (Mar 15, 2001) (posing the question raised by the Yahoo! decision of "how can
one jurisdiction decide what can or cannot be displayed on the World Wide Web?"); Mark
Grossman, Technology Law Column: Protect Yourself When Doing InternationalBusiness
on the Web, The Miami Herald (May 28, 2001) (noting that Yahoo! raises the issue of "to
what extent are we prepared to allow every country to regulate every website").
91 Apparently, Yahoo! volitionally removed Nazi memorabilia from all of its web sites
shortly after the French decree. See Razavi and Samman, 19 Communications Lawyer at
28 (cited in note 87).
92 The French court's remedy was based on an extensive expert report concluding that
the filtering was quite feasible given existing technology. See id (describing the findings of
an expert committee created by the French courts "to study the feasibility of a filtering
system to make Nazi-related content inaccessible to French users"). The court understood
the under-inclusive nature of the remedy-a determined French buyer could circumvent
the filtering-and did not impose liability on Yahoo! in those cases.
93 Compare Jack Goldsmith, Yahoo! Brought to Earth, Fin Times (London) 27 (Nov
20, 2000) (arguing that the French court reached reasonable accommodation and that the
holding only has implications for companies with presence or property in France); Razavi
and Samman, 19 Communications Lawyer at 28-29 (cited in note 87) ("The court looked
for a pragmatic solution rather than a perfect juridical solution, which might have included asking to close the American site or make it totally inaccessible to French users.").
See also Goldsmith and Sykes, 110 Yale L J at 120 (cited in note 62) ("[S]tates may not
impose burdens on out-of-state actors that outweigh the in-state benefits.").
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This comparative impairment approach can take account of
the evolving technology of the internet. As the feasibility of geography-specific regulation increases, the spillover costs are reduced. It is quite conceivable that France could, at some point,
more completely prevent the dissemination of material to its citizens without thereby burdening the dissemination of that material to everyone else.
But why would France, or the United States for that matter,
want to retrench its jurisdictional claims? One answer, I think, is
suggested by the Cybercrimes Panel. Globalization in general,
and the internet in particular, promise to impose a kind of Rawlsian veil of ignorance on jurisdiction policy. Expansive assertions
of jurisdiction by one state can increasingly be met by reciprocal
actions of another state.94
In a non-connected world, one state might be tempted to assert its effects-based jurisdictional authority without reference to
spillover effects. Any fear of reciprocal, expansive assertions of
authority by other sovereigns would be mitigated by a sense that
their capacity to enforce is limited. Technology and globalization
change that. As discussed by the panelists, any claim by the
United States of authority to seize data on foreign servers is tantamount to an invitation to foreign governments to search U.S.
computers.95 The technology forecloses unilateral practice. What's
good for the goose is good for the gander.
The proposed Hague Convention on enforcement of judgments, discussed by Dean Borchers and Professors Juenger and
Twitchell, is another example of the same phenomenon. The
United States was not a signatory to the earlier Brussels/Lugano
European treaties on the enforcement of judgments.9 6 Under
94 Indeed, the Yahoo! case is a good illustration. Following issuance of the French
injunction, Yahoo! sought its own injunction in a U.S. court against the UEJF and LICRA
to prevent its enforcement. See note 87. The U.S. court denied the motion brought by the
UEJF and LICRA to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that their acquisition
of an injunction against a California defendant and requiring actions to be taken in California, constituted sufficient connection with the forum to support jurisdiction. Yahoo!,
145 F Supp 2d at 1173-74.
95 See, for example, Patricia L. Bellia, ChasingBits across Borders, 2001 U Chi Legal
F 35, 61-80 (discussing unilateral cross-border searches); Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet
and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-BorderSearches, 2001 U Chi Legal F 103, 116 ("If FBI
officials can engage in remote cross-border searches, then governmental officials-not to
mention private parties-in other countries can do the same to U.S. computer databases.
The practice threatens to spin out of control, resulting in massive violations of territorial
sovereignty and computer privacy that make all nations worse off.").
96 The European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Brussels Convention"), 1972 OJ (L 229) 32,
reprinted in 8 ILM 229 (1968). The Convention has been amended since 1968, and the
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Brussels/Lugano, defendants from non-signatory nations were
exposed to the exercise of "exorbitant" jurisdiction, which was
prohibited against domiciles of member states. 7 Moreover, each
member state was obligated to enforce any such judgment,
whether or not it would have exercised such an exorbitant basis
in its own courts.9" As U.S. litigants engaged in greater global
economic activity and increasingly held assets in member states,
they were at a risk unknown in an isolated, local economy.9
Moreover, as interactions with foreign parties increased, there
was a growing perceived need for international enforcement of
U.S. judgments.' ° Accordingly, the United States wanted to be
included in a judgments convention; it needed to provide an effective legal order for its citizens, and one that reflected economic
reality. But inclusion came at the cost of "elbows in." The European countries insisted that the United States abandon general
jurisdiction as a precondition to receiving the privilege of international enforcement. 10 1
It may be that the kind of extraterritorial restraint I am suggesting is best imposed by treaty and legislation rather than by
courts pursuant to jurisdictional challenges. There is a collective
action problem in telling U.S. courts to "keep their elbows in"
without any guarantee that foreign courts will do the same. Although the Supreme Court is in a good position to solve the collective action problem domestically by imposing restraint on all
state and federal courts, it cannot command reciprocal restraint
by foreign governments. Moreover, as a separation of powers
matter, it would seem particularly appropriate for the political
branches to calibrate U.S. jurisdictional claims in relation to
current consolidated version may be found at 1990 OJ (C 189), reprinted in 29 ILM 1413
(1990).
97 See Brussels Convention at Arts 3-5, 28, 29 ILM at 1418-19, 1425 (cited in note
96).
98 See id at Art 28, 29 ILM at 1425. See also Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments
Project Be Saved? (cited in note 55) (describing the circumstances of when members of the
Brussels Convention are obligated to enforce the judgments entered by other member
States against domiciliaries of non-member states).
99 Consider Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project Be Saved? (cited in note 55)
(suggesting that the United States participation in the Hague Convention was motivated
to some degree by the desire to avoid the excesses of jurisdiction and enforcement under
the Brussels Convention against U.S. domiciliaries as well as the hope to gain more effective recognition of its own judgments abroad).
100 Id.
101 See Clermont, 85 Cornell L Rev at 95-96 (cited in note 2). The treaty would have
restrained the use of general jurisdiction over domiciles of member states even where no
extraterritorial enforcement was sought. See Silberman, Can the Hague Judgments Project be Saved? (cited in note 55).
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other sovereign interests." 2 In a very real sense, these are foreign
policy choices.

III. LIMITATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
A.

The Costs of Cooperation

Sovereignty is not simply the exercise of power, but a commitment to a particular legal order. As we have learned from the
both the Cybercrime and Universal Jurisdiction Panels, the surrender of sovereign control that comes with international cooperation presents problems. International order may come at the
expense of domestic order. Professor Bellia has demonstrated how
the cooperation implemented by treaty may collide with our domestic constitutional commitments. 10 3 Thus, when the United
States "permits" other states to engage in certain law enforcement activities, it may betray its constitutional obligation to respect the privacy and autonomy of its own citizens. Professor Bellia concludes that such domestic commitments trump any perceived need for coordinated law enforcement.0 4
A similar concern appears to drive some of the opponents of
universal jurisdiction. Indeed, for Professor Bradley, the central
problem of universal jurisdiction is that it violates several structural constraints on American government.0 5
The proposed Hague Convention, on enforcement of judgments0 6 poses a similar challenge. Under the current BrusSee Patrick J. Borchers, Judgments Conventions and Minimum Contacts, 61 Albany L Rev 1161, 1173-75 (1998) (suggesting that courts give deference to legislative
judgments concerning personal jurisdiction).
103 See Bellia, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 81-86 (cited in note 95) (discussing whether the
Constitution constrains the United States from entering into an international arrangement governing cross-border searches).
104 Id at 99 ("To the extent that the United States seeks to participate in consensual
cross-border search arrangements, then, it must take into account the limitations that the
Fourth Amendment imposes upon government conduct.").
105 Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U Chi Legal F 323,
327-34 (arguing that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the United States is ultimately determined by Congress, not international law or the federal courts). Bradley finds
civil enforcement of universal jurisdiction problematic because it vests in private parties
and the courts foreign affairs judgments that are properly exercised by the Executive
Branch. He also suggests that federal statutory authorization for private claims based on
universal jurisdiction may exceed Congress's Article I authority. See id at 342-49. See also
Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 97 Mich L Rev 2129, 2182 (1999) (suggesting that private enforcement of international human rights claims in U.S. courts "implicates significant foreign relations issues
102

...best resolved by the
106 See Hague Draft

political branches").

Proposal (cited in note 84). Consider Silberman, Can the Hague
Project Be Saved? (cited in note 55).
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sels/Lugano Conventions (to which the United States is not a signatory), mere injury in the forum is a sufficient basis for personal
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the absence of any forum-directed
activity on the defendant's part. 1 7 Thus, the European community appears committed to an exercise of personal jurisdiction
that would be deemed in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
under World-Wide Volkswagen."' Both the direct exercise of such
jurisdiction by an American court, as well the U.S. enforcement of
a foreign default judgment based on mere injury, would be problematic.
The solution to all of these problems is, on one level, relatively simple: whatever accommodations the United States makes
to an international legal order, it cannot do so in contravention of
the Constitution.0 9 That does not preclude, however, the possibility that constitutional standards may themselves be amenable to
a flexible interpretation in regard to treaty obligations.
Consider, for instance, the collision of Brussels/Lugano with
World-Wide Volkswagen. One of the central concerns of WorldWide Volkswagen was that a forum state should not illegitimately
assume power properly belonging to another state.110 That con-

107 Brussels Convention at Art 5(3), 1990 OJ at 4, 29 ILM at 1419 (cited in note 96)
(providing for tort jurisdiction in "the place where the harmful event occurred"). See
Borchers, 61 Albany L Rev at 1161-64 (cited in note 102) (arguing that although Article
5(3) of the Brussels Convention may provide a clear and sensible jurisdictional rule, it
may not be entirely consistent with American jurisdictional doctrine).
108 See 444 US at 295 (rejecting personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on a
single in-forum injury in the absence of those "affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction" required as a matter of due proc-

ess). See also Asahi Metal Industry, Co, Ltd v Superior Court of California,480 US 102,

109-11 (1987) (explicating the due process limitations on a court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant); Patrick J. Borchers, ComparingPersonalJurisdiction in the United States and European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 Am

J Comp L 121, 123 (1992) (comparing tort jurisdiction under Article 5(3) of the Brussels
Convention with that of World-Wide Volkswagen).

109 See Borchers, 61 Albany L Rev at 1167 (cited in note 102) ("[T]here are good reasons to think that the constitutional limitations on jurisdiction will not present serious
obstacles to an international judgments convention."); Stanley E. Cox, Why Properly Construed Due Process Limits on Jurisdiction Must Always Trump Contrary Treaty Provi-

sions, 61 Albany L Rev 1177, 1178 (1988) ("[A] constitutional provision always takes
precedence over a treaty, provided that the constitutional provision is of the sort meant to
guarantee individual rights against majority infringement or against arbitrary exercises
of governmental power.").
110 See 444 US at 294:

[Tihe Framers . . . intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try
causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a
limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister States-a limitation express
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cern would appear to be substantially mitigated by the powersharing implemented by treaty. The defendant's home state certainly does have legitimate jurisdiction. If the home state wants
to, in effect, "transfer" the case to the state of injury, that would
represent a very different kind of problem than the unilateral
assertion of jurisdiction by the state of injury in World-Wide
Volkswagen."'
Nor should our commitment to constitutional supremacy necessarily preclude the United States from acknowledging, even
formally, that individuals can increasingly be subject to multiple,
conflicting legal regimes. The realities of a connected world require states to rethink how the maps of sovereignty are drawn." 2
We can no longer pretend that physical presence in one place
means only that one state will lay claim to regulatory authority.
As applied to Professor Bellia's problem of transnational investigatory authority, perhaps the awareness of overlapping sovereign claims should inform our sense of whether a treaty permitting expansive searches by foreign governments of computers located in the United States ought to be considered state action by
the United States. To a significant degree, all the United States
has done is acknowledge technological reality; it has not facilitated the search, but only declined to make it a cause for interna-

or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Some scholars view Justice White's observation in InsuranceCorp of Ireland v Compagnie

des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694, 702-03 n 10 (1982), that the due process limitations
on the exercise of personal jurisdiction "must be seen as ultimately a function of the liberty interest ... rather than as a function 'of federalism concerns'" as a repudiation of this
federalism perspective. See, for example, Robert H. Abrams and Paul R. Dimond, Toward
a ConstitutionalFramework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction,69 Minn L Rev 75,

80-81 (1984). As I have argued elsewhere, I do not believe the federalism concerns and the
liberty interests are inconsistent. See Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 711-14 (cited in note 6).
111 Compare Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers" for International Shoe (And None for
Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 UC Davis L Rev

755, 762-67 (1995) (arguing that statutory authorization affects the constitutional analysis), with Borchers, 61 Albany L Rev at 1173-75 (cited in note 102) (contending that the
Court properly defers to political judgments concerning the appropriate reach of jurisdiction).
112 Legal pluralists, who recognize that legal authority is not exercised exclusively by
governments, have long asserted that physical borders are an imperfect measure of how
legal authority is allocated. See Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Mediation, 12

Cardozo L Rev 959, 996-98 (1991) (arguing against "state exclusivism" and a view of the
physical extension of the law that relies on "borders (that] must always be definitively,
formally, defined").
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tional protest. The foreign government has not been deputized; it
already had a badge.13
The constraint of fidelity to domestic legal norms will no
doubt make it more complicated to craft an international legal
order. That complexity underscores the point that cooperation
and restraint are not code for the surrender of sovereignty. The
challenge is not to build a single legal order, but to make sense
out of the increasing collisions of discrete legal systems.
B.

The Limits of Private Ordering

One inevitable response to regulatory confusion is suggested
by Dean Perritt: private ordering holds out the promise of providing legal certainty in an environment of jurisdictional confusion.114 Dean Perritt recognizes, however, the limits of such a solution. Parties contract against the background of legal rules and
depend upon courts to give effect to their ordering. Even when
the parties are in a position to exercise self-help, they depend on
the forbearance of courts to respect the consequences of private
enforcement. 115
Dean Perritt offers the apt example of the blacklisting of
email abusers pursuant to the Mail Abuse Prevention System, or
"MAPS."11 That private ordering is potentially undermined by
lawsuits brought by the blacklisted parties against the blacklister. The effectiveness of that private enforcement mechanism depends on whether the blacklisted party is able to seek judicial
redress. That requires the complicity of the state. Privatization
thus represents a choice by the state not to regulate in deference
113 An instructive parallel is the treatment of allegedly unconstitutional actions by
Indian tribal governments. In Talton v Mayes, 163 US 376, 384-85 (1896), the Court held
the Fifth Amendment requirement of a grand jury inapplicable to criminal trials by tribal
courts on the theory that, notwithstanding the treaties with the United State cedingjurisdiction to the Cherokee Nation, the tribal courts were exercising sovereign power that was
independent and prior to federal power. See also United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 329
(1978) (holding double jeopardy clause inapplicable to the retrial of a defendant previously
tried by a tribal court, saying that "the tribe acts as an independent sovereign, and not as
an arm of the Federal Government").
114 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Toward a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet,
2001 U Chi Legal F 215, 217-21 (discussing the advantages of private regulation of the
internet over traditional regulation by public agencies).
115 See Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarcy, 65 U Chi L Rev 1199, 1245-46 (1998)
(arguing that to make private ordering effective, "national courts must subsequently recognize the validity of the private dispute resolution process ....enjoin subsequent litigation in derogation of the results of the private dispute resolution, and enforce any judgments that cannot be done so privately").
116 Perritt, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 238-40, 244-48 (cited in note 114).
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to private ordering. Like any regulatory preference, it is subject
to the vagaries of jurisdictional conflicts.
Once we recognize that the state is a silent partner to private
ordering, we see the limits of contract as a jurisdictional panacea.
Although the parties may contractually opt for a particular choice
of law and/or forum to give effect to their ordering, any court in
which a party seeks judicial redress must choose to respect the
contractual choice. As Dean Perritt recognizes, that decision may
well turn on judgments about the quality of consent, as well as
the substantive fairness of their contract.117 And different states
may well have different attitudes toward those questions.
As Professor Epstein concedes, private ordering is particularly ineffective in resolving jurisdictional controversies between
strangers where an action in one place has brought about an injury in another: "it is very difficult to envision on a transactionby-transaction basis any rule that, after the fact, is likely to bring
about a Pareto improvement, that is, one that improves the welfare of both sides simultaneously."'18 Accordingly, it is impossible
to resolve this central jurisdictional conflict through the lens of
private ordering, because there is no single forum or law to which
both parties would have agreed ex ante.
That is not to say that private ordering cannot alleviate some
jurisdictional problems. It may well be that there is greater international consensus on honoring private ordering than on the
principles that ought to govern interjurisdictional transactions in
the absence of private ordering. An internet service agreement
that forbids selling offensive material over the internet is far
more likely to be enforced internationally than is the law of any
country in which information about the sale was disseminated.
Conclusion: Spaghetti Westerns

C.

Finally, I want to try to untangle some of the spaghetti I
lumped together at the outset. A full exposition of these issues is
well beyond the scope of my assignment as commentator. But let
me isolate some of the larger strands. Is it appropriate to collapse, as I have, authority to legislate and authority to adjudicate? The conventional account is that interstate conflict is mitigated, if not eliminated by appropriate choice-of-law rules.119 A
Id at 269-70.
118 Epstein, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 29 (cited in note 7).
119 The primacy of choice-of-law as the device-of-choice to mediate competing state
regulatory interests is demonstrated by Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Keeton v Hustler
117
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state's assertion of personal jurisdiction, under this view, does
not implicate sovereign prerogatives to the same extent as applying its law and accordingly should not be as constrained as choice
of law. 2 ° In other words, as long as a state applies the "proper"
law to an adjudication, its assertion of personal jurisdiction does
not infringe significantly on regulatory prerogatives of other
states.
I think we are learning that the conventional view overstates
the case. Several of the Universal Jurisdiction panelists were
worried about the perils of provincial prosecutions under universal jurisdiction; 2 ' they certainly recognize that authority to enforce law is a meaningful and problematic regulatory act. The
same legal rules applied by different authorities can have radically different meanings. I have elsewhere argued that the
Court's personal jurisdiction doctrine is based on the premise
that adjudicatory authority is primarily justified by regulatory
interests.12 2 It is true that procedure does not directly regulate

Magazine, Inc, 465 US 770 (1984). There, the Court minimized the significance of the fact
that New Hampshire, by virtue of asserting personal jurisdiction, was able to extend its
long statute of limitations to a defamation claim having only a minor connection to New
Hampshire:
Strictly speaking, however, any potential unfairness in applying New
Hampshire's statute of limitations to all aspects of this nationwide suit
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate the
claims. "The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law." . . . The
question of the applicability of New Hampshire's statute of limitations to
claims for out-of-state damages presents itself in the course of litigation
only after jurisdiction over respondent is established, and we do not think
that such choice of law concerns should complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry.
Id at 778. See also Perry Dane, Vested Rights, 'Vestedness,' and Choice of Law, 96 Yale L J
1191, 1249-53 (1987) (noting the mitigation of interstate conflict achieved by choice-of-law
rules).
120 Ironically, at least as a matter of due process, the Court has subjected personal
jurisdiction to far more searching constitutional scrutiny than choice of law. See Allstate
Insurance Co v Hague, 449 US 302, 317-18 (1981) ("By virtfie of its presence, Allstate can
hardly claim unfamiliarity with the laws of the host jurisdiction and surprise that the
state courts might apply forum law to litigation in which the company is involved."); Linda
J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era,53 NYU L Rev 33, 82 (1978) (suggesting that there should be greater due process constraints on choice of law than on personal
jurisdiction).
121 See, for example, Rubin, 2001 U Chi Legal F at 370 (cited in note 52) ("We may act
by our own perceptions and apply [our interpretations of international law] within our
own jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate, but if we apply them to others, like revolutionaries or Muslims, how do we argue that the international legal order prevents their
applying their prescriptions to us?").
122 Consider Stein, 65 Tex L Rev 689 (cited in note 6). See also Stanley E. Cox, Razing
Conflicts Facades to Build Better JurisdictionTheory: The Foundation-ThereIs No Law
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conduct, but it has enough of an effect to make it sensible to view
it as a regulatory act.
Like Justice Field in Pennoyer, I have also conflated domestic
and international principles of jurisdiction. This is characteristic
of the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in general. Although the Court has expressed concern over the heightened convenience problems implicated in international cases,123 it has not
treated a state's claim of authority over a foreign defendant as
different in kind from its authority to adjudicate the claims of
domestic, out-of-state defendants. As I alluded above, there may,
in fact, be some important differences.
First, to the extent that jurisdictional principles reflect the
appropriate spheres of power in a legal network, those spheres
may vary according to the nature of the network. As the Supreme
Court stated in World-Wide Volkswagen, the legitimacy of an assertion of jurisdiction turns, in part, on "the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[ I] and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."1" 4 Where, as
within the United States, the administration of justice is a coordinated effort, with states sharing substantially common regulatory values, interstate assertions of jurisdiction may be less problematic than when substantially different legal systems collide.
In other words, authority in a legal network may be shared, conceivably permitting and facilitating more expansive assertions of
jurisdiction than would otherwise be possible.
But cooperation cuts two ways. Interstate "poaching" within
the United States violates the "elbows-in" principle; the cost of
membership in a coordinated legal network is self-restraint.
Thus, to some extent, we would expect to see more respect for the

But Forum Law, 28 Val U L Rev 1, 15-16 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's formulation of its due process choice-of-law test).
123 See Asahi Metal Industry, Co, Ltd v Superior Court of California,480 US 102, 116
(1987) (weighing "the international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and
the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State" in determining that California's
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant 'would be unreasonable and
unfair").
124 444 US at 292.
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autonomy of member states within a coordinated network than
among isolated sovereigns.12
In closing, I want to return to the "frontier" metaphor I
started with. There is a wonderful irony here. Our picture of the
Old West was the consequence of a legal vacuum: too much territory, not enough sheriffs. The parallel frontier qualities we have
seen here are, in significant measure, a consequence of too much
law operating in too little space. The collision of competing sovereign claims seems to have indeed produced a frontier, but one
borne of connectedness, comity and restraint rather than of isolation.

125 See, for example, Brussels Convention at Art 3 (cited in note 96) (permitting "exorbitant" bases of jurisdiction against non-signatory state defendants).

